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Documentary realism and film pleasure: Two moments from Euzhan Palcy's A Dry Wh te Season
A b stract
T h is e ssa y e x a m in e s s o m e o f th e stra in s a n d te n s io n s a r o u n d th e n o tio n s o f fi lm p le a su r e a n d d o cum entary realism in the film A D ry W hite Season. It offers a schem atic analysis o f th e history o f the idea o f a po litic s o f film pleasure in th e early w ork on m a ss culture o f th e F rankfurt S c h o o l a n d F.R. L eavis, a n d m o re recent debates in fe m in is m . T his general acc o u n t then p ro vid e s th e co n text f o r the ex a m in a tio n o f s o m e o f the p ro b lem s in Palcy's film , fo c u sin g particularly o n th e q u estio n o f Palcy's claim s fo r a docum entary realism, a n d tw o particular m o m e n ts in the film itse lf
"The fact is I was reproducing history, not fiction" (Euzhan Palcy).'
Econom y/Ideology/Pleasure
'T h at is the kind of question that we should ask the people with the money and the power to produce films." Thus Euzhan Palcy in reply to a question at the London Film Festival in 1990 after the screening of her film version of A ndré Brink's A Dry White Season. The question rem ains w hether it is possible to make a com m ercial film about South Africa which doesn't turn into a story about a white middle-class family. The question and the answer point to the necessity for understanding film in relation to questions of the politics of pleasure. For we need always to understand that the industry which is cinem a always functions on two intersectin g levels. F irst, econom ically, as th e m aterial industry of machinery, investment, contracts, advertising and finance which makes and sells films; and second, as C hristian M etz p o in ted out long ago, ideologically, as an industry of the imaginary, one which makes and sells films on the basis of the spectator's pleasure.2 This pleasure, the multiple delights offered by narrative cinem a, is always bound up with the production of meanings, and therefore with a consequent politics, even though on a first view, pleasure and politics may seem to be mutually exclusive. For pleasure belongs to the w orld of the p riv ate individual, is a q u estio n o f self-p leasin g and a m a tte r of selfindulgence, while politics is concerned with the public world, with social collectivities and social action. Pleasure is a m atter of sensual distraction from the harsh edges of the world, while politics confronts the world's harshness, challenges it, and seeks to transform it. But to transform it how? Answer; to make the harsh world yield more pleasure to us. At that point -where we begin to realize that the aim of all politics is finally utopian, is ultimately to increase our pleasure in the world -our confidence in that apparently simple opposition begins to wane.
How does this general paradox and this ap p aren t opposition work in relatio n to film? What are the politics of film pleasure? Before turning to some of the particular problems posed by Palcy's.4 Dry White Season it is worth examining, even very schem atically, the historical contours of the existing debate.
The politics of film pleasure
In a first mom ent of analysis, that opposition rem ained intact. For the Frankfurt School, the politics of film pleasure are clear. Film pleasure is an enemy to politics because the film industry works to create a com pliant and submissive audience of passive consumers. Film pleasure saps the potential political consciousness of the m asses w ho are doubly exploited: publicly, as w orkers in th e lab o u r m ark et, and priv ately , as th e passive consumers of the culture industry's standardized products. The em ancipatory aspects of high culture -the ways in which it could raise a critical consciousness -are lost or parodied in the routines and repetitions of the culture industry: "As soon as the film begins, it is quite clear how it will end, and who will be rewarded, punished, or forgotten" (A dorno & H orkheim er [1979:125] in Dialectics o f Enlightenment). The politics of film pleasure are, in this view, simple. Film pleasure is antithetical to the developm ent of political conscious ness. Film has becom e w hat religion was to the nin eteen th century: the opium o f the masses. It is a pleasure which is addictive, enervating and finally destructive. It must be resisted at all costs.
The nascent English studies of the Cambridge school had already shown similar resistance to and distaste for th e new m ass a rt form in th e 1930s. F .R . L eavis gave a notable characterisation of film in his early pam phlet, "Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture". H ere, because of its greater power and immediacy, the cinem a was seen as even m ore of a th re a t to the vitality of cu ltu re th an th e em e rg en t tab lo id p ress p io n ee red by Lord Northcliffe:
... film s have a so m uch m o re p o te n t influence. T hey provide now th e m a in fo rm o f re c re a tio n in th e civilised w orld; an d they involve su rre n d e r, u n d e r con d itio n s o f hyp no tic recep tiv ity , to th e ch e ap est e m o tio n a l appeals, ap p e als ih e m o re insidious b c c a u se th e y a re asso cia ted w ith a co m p ellingly vivid illusion o f a c tu al life. It w ould b e d im cu lt to d isp u te th a t th e result m ust b e serio u s d am ag e to th e 'sta n d a rd o f living' ... it will n o t b e d isp u te d th a t bro ad castin g , like th e film s, is in p ractice , m ainly a m e an s o f p assive diversion, an d th a t it len d s to m a k e active re c rc a tio n , esp ecially active use o f the m ind, m o re dim cult (L eavis [1933:20-21] in For Continuity).
In brief, if the purpose of the new literary studies was to save the world from mass culture, as it was for Leavis, then film should never receive a place in the curriculum. Implicit in Leavis's argum ent is, of course, the idea of English studies as a form of 'active recreation', a training in the 'active use of the m ind'. But if we attend to this idea seriously, then the arguments for keeping film out of the canon dissolve. For what if making film the object of serious attention and analysis resulted in just such an activity of mind, just such a critical literacy? Leavis's argument relied upon a claim that literary texts were intrinsically capable o f generating intellectual activity, and refused to see that this activity of the mind might itself be simply a product of critical attention and analysis.3
. The feminist slant
Som ething of this sam e opposition -though in a different register -is rep eated in the second major phase of attention to the question of film pleasure. This second phase is the feminist attack on film pleasure, an attack which still owes a great deal to Laura Mulvey's sem inal essay of 1975, "Visual Pleasure and N arrative Cinema". For Mulvey, the visual p leasure of narrative cinem a had its roots deep in the psychic structures of patriarchy. H ere the sadistic and controlling power of the gaze belongs to the man while the woman is reduced to being the object of that gaze, and is always at the mercy of its violent voyeurism. The relative subtleties o f film noir only express the same structural violence to women as the most banal slasher movie. Even m asterpieces such as H itchcock's Rear Window and Vertigo only make apparent the ways in which cinem a is a patriarchal institution in which the role of woman -the force and necessity of her representation -is always and only to pleasu re the m ale spectator. Indeed th ere is even the suspicion th a t these films are re g a rd e d as ijja iie rp ie c e s p recisely b e c a u se they em body in th e m ost su b tle and sophisticated ways the repressive structure of patriarchal representation. "It is said that analy sin g p le a su re , or b eau ty , d estro y s it. T h a t is th e in te n tio n ," w rites M ulvey. 'T raditional filmic pleasure," she insists, "must be broken down".'* Fem inists and Frankfurt school theorists agree th at film pleasure should be opposed on political grounds. But these grounds differ in im portant ways. For the Frankfurt theorists, F r a n c is M u lh e rn n o te s th a t th e "c o n se n su a l ju d g m e n t o f th e Scrutiny g r o u p w as c ru sh in g ly n eg a tiv e. O .D . L eavis saw th e c in em a as o n e o f th e 'd isru p tiv e fo rces' th a t now th r e a te n e d to ex tin g u ish th e c u ltu re o f th e w o rk in g class. 
■'
S ee L a u ra M ulvey (1985:305-315) . T a n ia M odleski, in The Woman Who Knew Too Much (1988) seek s to give a m o re m o d u la te d ap p ro a c h to H itchcock focusing o n th e am b iv alen ce o f his films to w ard s fem ininity; " ... w hat I w ant to arg u e is neither th a t H itch co ck is u tterly m isogynistic nor th a t h e is la rg e ly s y m p a th e tic to w o m e n an d th e ir p lig h t in p a tria rc h y , b u t th a t h is w o rk is c h a ra c te r is e d by a th o r o u g h g o in g a m b iv a le n c e a b o u t fe m in in ity "(3). L e sle y B rill, in The Hitchcock Romance (1988) also arg u es against "recent fem inist attack s o n H itchcock" in favour o f a re a d in g o f H itc h c o c k "as a c re a to r o f ro m a n c e , I find his film s to b e p o w erfu l criticism s o f p atriarch a l assu m p tio n s ra th e r than sym ptom s of them " (xiv). T h e d e b a te is clearly far fro m over. film pleasure is wrong because it is a distraction from political reality, a sapping o f the public into the private realm . In contrast, fem inists argue th at the dom inant forms of pleasure should be resisted because these form s o f p leasure are p a rt and parcel of an oppressive political reality. Film contributes to political reality because its pleasures are in large p a rt pleasures o f rep re se n tatio n and iden tificatio n : film is not ideological just because it rep resen ts reality wrongly, b u t because it helps to c re ate and sustain the identities we have in the world. Film pleasure is then a question of representation in the two main senses of the word: as the aesthetic category of mimesis, as a question of realism, and also as the crucial political category of delegation. T hus while the F rankfurt school theorists feared that film pleasure contributed to the w eakening o f the public sphere of political action by redirecting the energies of the masses into the private sphere, feminists, refusing the division betw een public and p riv ate ( 'the p e rso n al is p o litic al') and the consequent relegation of film to the anti-political, accept the question of film pleasure as fully political, as a question of ideology.
Mulvey's polemic set the terms for a controversial and ongoing debate; and established the fram ew ork for a research program m e for a history of w om en's rep re se n ta tio n in film. W hatever the th e o re tic a l flaws in M ulvey's o riginal argum ents, h er program m e has nonetheless helped to produce a substantial quantity of research into the film archive which w ithout her work might never have been done. Critics have pointed, in general, to two w eaknesses in her account. First, for all its focus on the representation of women, the theory seem ed to leave no place for the specifically fem ale spectator. If cinem a was a purely male institution, yet another 'bachelor m achine', how and why did women get to enjoy films? And secondly, Mulvey's call for an avant-garde destruction of film pleasure (apparent in G odard's films of the sixties and early seventies, and in Mulvey's own work with Peter Wollen) seem ed to work only for an elite audience, one educated in film history enough to appreciate the shock of a form alist assault on film pleasure. Was there any space in Mulvey's paradigm for a politically progressive cinema for the masses?D o such theoretical questions have a particular force in the discussion of progressive South African cinema? Some might assert that attention to these First World debates can have little or no relevance to the South African situation, particularly when feminism as such remains a deeply marginalized political force. Feminists would reply th at in this context, there is all the more urgency to seek to bring these questions to the fore. Two particular a re a s of w ork suggest them selv es. F irst, reg a rd in g e d u c a tio n in th e analysis and in terp retatio n of film and visual narrative, including not only film as such but also the analysis of TV and advertising. And second, with regard to film, video and TV production.
The centrality of filmic pleasure
With regard to education, the question of pleasure is central. Ask anyone why they go to the cinem a, and the answer is likely to be escapism, the pleasure of escaping the self, of leaving daily cares in suspension for 90 m inutes o r so o f w hat we can call n arrativ e dreaming. For the pleasure of the film is akin to the pleasure of dreaming: our usual sense of self-consciousness is suspended and an o th er voice takes over th at ongoing narrative which makes us the subject of our consciousness. In this suspended state, the film does our dream ing -tells our story -for us. The spectator and the analyst enjoy different positions in relation to this pleasurable narrative.
A condition of the pleasure of that narrative is that the spectator can 'make sense' of the film and the spectator's reading of a film is concerned above all to 'make sense' of it, to achieve the position of understanding that which the film narrative attem pts to inscribe for the spectator. The analyst's reading of a film is a meta-reading; it is concerned primarily with the u nderstanding and analysis of th at inscription. The film analyst attem p ts to understand how the film is understood; how the film seeks to position the spectator so that the film can be understood. While the spectator reads the narrative of the film, the analyst reads its narration, its address, its construction of that narrative which is entertained by and which entertains the spectator. While the spectator enjoys the film, the analyst reads how that enjoyment -how that pleasure -is constructed.
Such a reading -which necessarily takes a critical distance from the film -can become a political act, a raising of political consciousness, in itself. For the pleasures of the film are generated not only by the enormous visual pleasures of film narration itself, with its larger than life but true to life images, but at the sam e tim e by the film 's dream like flow of meanings. Those meanings are always social and political, are always ideological. Our p leasu re in film always has a price beyong th at of th e cinem a ticket, and th a t is the subscription -at least for the moment of the film itself -to its ideological position. Unless we en ter the cinem a in a doggedly critical way, intent on refusing the pleasures of the lowering of self-consciousness associated with film viewing, then it is only when we come out of the cinema, and break with that dreamlike state, that our ordinary self-consciousness returns, and with it, the potential for discussing and criticising the film.
T here are then two mom ents to film pleasure and they need to be sharply distinguished. These are the pleasure of the mom ent of consumption -an essentially supine and passive pleasure; and the pleasure of the moment of discussion (like the retelling of a dream ) -a potentially active as well as enjoyable moment. The skills and techniques of film analysis and interpretation can improve and increase the pleasure of th at second, more sociable mom ent when the private spectator rejoins the public crowd. The focus of the moment of p leasu re can be shifted from w ithin the cinem a -the m om ent o f en terta in m e n t, the pleasurably passive consumption of meaning -to outside the cinem a-m achine where that passivity gives way to the active production and analysis of meaning. O ur educational task is to make available the tools and resources of analysis to better enable such active debate.
For the film analyst, it little m atters w hether a film text intends to be progressive or not. T hrough active discussion and in terp retatio n , any film text can be m ade the object of progressive analysis. A significant part of such analysis is likely to concern the question of film pleasure, both as a general theoretical question (involving questions of voyeurism, gender, questions of feminism) and with specific regard to the operation o f the particular film in question -the issues it raises and its adequacy in dealing with them.
5.
Ideological representation of apartheid
Regarding production in South Africa, the main tasks are surely to dismantle the system of representation which apartheid has put into place as a significant p a rt of its ideological p ro ject. T h e first th in g to q u e stio n is its re p re s e n ta tio n (h e re new s, fic tio n and documentary come together) of the social totality. For apartheid not only divides; it also makes invisible. The first task is to make as widely available as possible representations of the whole of South African society, so that the invisible is made visible, so that the human consequences of economic, social and racial division can be articulated. O ne of the major consequences -in representation -of apartheid has been to m ake South Africa a foreign and unknown country to its own citizens. The first task is then one of reflection: but not, I believe, only of reflection, but also for active and critical analysis.** For how can be the divisions of apartheid be shown? They must also be understood. As I argue elsewhere, the task should also be a critical task. A truly dem ocratic cultural practice should encourage the agency and activity of its users, should seek to em pow er them as readers rath er than have them conform to the aesthetic of a passive realism . H ere the question of the politics is again an inescapable one. Production and education must work to g eth er and refuse the easy sep aratio n s of com m ercial defin itio n , the opposition of entertainm ent to education, of the academy to the market place. We need to tell our own stories, we need to dream our own dream s. To do this, the politics o f film pleasure must not be neglected, particularly in relation to a film such asA Dry White Season.
A Dry White Season: An intersection of the financial and the ideological
Palcy was quite clea r on the good in te n tio n s o f h e r film , and th ese I do not deny.'^ Nonetheless, I wish to raise some problem s concerning the ways in which these intentions are them selves th re a te n e d by th e d o u b le eco n o m ics o f film p le a s u re , th a t crucial intersection of the financial and the ideological. Two m om ents of the film interest me in this regard.
The first takes place early on in the film and occupies some five or seven seconds. H ere the m ilitant children are ad dressing W ellington, the g ard en er, explaining to him the necessity for th eir dem o n stratio n s, one of which has already resu lted in som e brutal sjambokking. One of the children explains:
specifically situ ated . T he referen ce to th e question of A frikaans as th e m edium of instruction in black schools locates us in, or refers us to the historical tim e of the diegesis, to 1976 and the mass demonstrations -particularly in Soweto -in which some five hundred to a thousand people, many of them young students, were killed by police in scenes similar to those shown in the movie. T here is no strong narrative motivation for this information. We need to know that there are demonstrations (this we are shown repeatedly), but we are not usually told why there are demonstrations (this scene stands out because it does seek to give us some inform ation, an expansion o f the earlier key phrase -"How can we fight for freed o m w hen o u r eld ers sit drinking th e b e e r th a t buys the b u llets th a t sh o o t our brothers?"). It is a scene which appears to address us in a strictly docum entary mode, acting as the guarantor of the film's good faith, the documentary realism which Palcy so "insisted upon when she stated: "The fact is I was reproducing history, not fiction."
But I w ant to suggest that the scene o p erates in an oth er way as well, one in which its docum entary appeal is contradicted or subverted. This is due, in the first instance, simply to the scene's insertion in a sequence of scenes and individual shots, the very basis, as Jurij Lotman reminds us, of the production of cinematic meaning.® 7. Narrative meanings constraining the film's documentary referentiality W hat I am referrin g to is the fact th a t the docum entary m essage of this scene -the inform ation about the occasion of the Sowetan uprising o f 1976 -th at message is given verbally, and that on a first level of interpretation. Especially for literary students, with their reliance on the word, it might seem that this documentary aspect is able to dominate th e sem iotic process. But I w ant to suggest th at this 'd o cum entary m essage' is itself threatened, is already in a sense dispersed, by the fact that the spectator does not simply 'hear' the words, can not simply refer them to that historical context (which they cannot by their act of reference recreate for viewers, only ever, possibly, in the real sense of the word, refer them to, point them towards other sources, other reconstructive texts); but that the words themselves are uttered in a narrative sequence which is itself generating a powerful structure of meanings and that these narrative meanings act to constrain -at this pointthe film's documentary referentiality, its attem pt at a documentary realism.
I refer of course to what I em phasized in my description of the scene -to W ellington's pain, to the pathos of the scene, the shift from the shot of the child's speech to the close-up of W ellington's face. For what I am trying to suggest is that the documentary import of the utterance -its reference to the events of 1976 -is doubled by and perhaps underm ined by the ways in which it is immediately narrativised, is subsumed by the relentless sequentiality o f film into the em otio nal response of one o f the ch aracters o f the film. A nd this is particularly the case in a film of this kind, for one of the main aspects o f the novelistic film is to go for the effects of interiority usually associated with the novel. We might say that th e act of ex tern al refe re n c e -referen ce to real h isto rical ev en ts -is im m ediately 
Cinematic meaning is meaning expressed by the resources o f cinematic language, and it is impossible outside that language' ( a u th o r's italics).
narrativised, is im m ediately m ade into a m eaning for a character in the film, is given a bearing on and for the character, becomes in fact less a reference to that external reality than to the inner life of the character. Indeed, in my view, it threatens to become solely a sign of that interiority.
These few seconds of the film are exemplary, for me, in their posing of a problem for a film of this type, and for the kind o f p leasu re associated w ith it. F o r the pleasu re o f the novelistic film, if we accept this as one particular sub-genre in classic Hollywood narrative, are the pleasures of identification with characters in a narrative which can be read as the story of a universal search for truth.
The main character's dilemma -the search for truth -is universal, though placed in South Africa by the kind of reference we have just discussed. But then, the force of that context itself dim inishes, shrinks to becom ing m ere background or backdrop -not foreground, m atter of analysis -for the narrative. It loses its point, just as here the very brief attem pt at foregrounding the film's reference to historical reality is soon resolved into a background, in this example, the background for the expression of W ellington's pain as a human being, the pathos of W ellington as a rep resen tativ e of universal divisions (betw een child and adult, father and son) -the object, then, of identification for an undifferentiated audience, the audience projected as the universal singular of Hollywood cinema.
Indeed, for the local South A frican viewer, many details necessarily in tru d e upon the a tte m p te d sm o o th n e ss o f th is p le a s u re o f u n iv e rsa l ( r e a d A m e ric a n /E u ro p e a n ) identification. Foreign accents -even or perhaps particularly when im itating the localsound provocatively off-key, refuse to ring true, offend the documentary pleasures offered by the movie.
The tension between documentation and universalising
Let us follow up an example offered by Palcy herself, one in relation to the question of the documentary realism of the film. "I would like to say," she urges, "that the pictures Marlon Brando shows when he challenges Captain Stolz are photographs that I got from Amnesty In tern atio n al. They are not ju st p h o to g rap h s th a t we m ade for the film" (27). T his connects to the general question of the reproduction of history in film and can be stated as a question regarding the semiotic significance of Marlon B rando's commanding presence in the film in the role of Advocate De Villiers.
For me, the problem comes through the close-up of B rando uttering the following words: "Justice in South Africa is misapplied when it comes to the question of race." For isn't this the essential message o f the film? T he som ething which everyone can agree on as a constituents of that universal subject? In a sense, the question pleases, gives pleasure, when uttered by Brando. It sums up the situation for the spectator; but in summing it up, is it not a statem ent which expresses, simplifies, distorts, projects? It is a sentence which works to represent South African reality in a particular way, to convert the raw and brutal m aterial of that reality into commodity form, into the form o f the commodity as meaning. B rando in this represents the liberal conscience of the West, and in so doing, places the spectator in it.
The pleasure of the documentary, the pleasure of a documentary realism, is then obtained at a price, the price of universalising th e concerns o f the film; and, in the context of Hollywood cinem a, this universalising means, of course, making South Africa fam iliar to the A m erican viewer.
And w hat is lost in this representation is just what that earlier m om ent tries to contain, wishes to express: som ething o f th e precise constituted m ateriality o f South A frican history. South A frican reality. It is in this tension betw een these two m om ents from the film, the m om ent, soon lost, of docum entation, and the m om ent im mediately found again o f universalising, that we find some of the m ajor constitutive tensions of docum entary realism itself, and the paradoxical film pleasure it realises, the ideology of film pleasure which it allows, and which it contains: and which we should, as critical viewers, question. The question that we should ask the people with the money and the power to produce films is always then a form of the question of film pleasure.
